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Abstract
The European Commission’s outreach to interest groups implies that they function as ‘transmis-
sion belts’ that aggregate and articulate interests as policy-relevant information for policy-
makers. Operating as a transmission belt, however, requires an organizational design fit for this
purpose. We offer one of the first systematic analyses of how organizational design affects interest
group access to public officials. We draw from a novel dataset of 248 EU-level interest groups
including data on several dimensions of organizational design. One of our key findings is that
qualified majority and consensus-facilitating decision-making procedures help interest groups gain
access to administrative and political officials, whereas functional differentiation is important to
get access to administrative officials, but not to political officials. Our findings thus demonstrate
the relevance of organizational design in gaining access as well as the need to incorporate varying
informational demands of public officials to properly explain interest group access to public
decision-making.
Keywords: Interest group; organizational design; access; EU administrative officials; EU political
officials
Introduction
Interest groups are seen as crucial components of political representation in most western
democracies. The European Commission for instance has long reached out to civil society
groups, in particular European Associations (EAs), to ensure encompassing interest
representation, efficient policy input, and support during implementation (European
Commission, 2002; Greenwood, 2002; Greenwood and Webster, 2000; Michalowitz,
2004; Schmitter and Streeck, 1999). Such active outreach is driven by the expectation that
interest groups serve as a transmission belt, by providing (supra) national public institu-
tions with useful policy information and simultaneously aggregating and representing
diverse constituency interests (Berkhout et al., 2017a; Kohler-Koch and Quittkat, 2013).
The transmission belt function is a complex issue of organizational design, yet how in-
terest groups organize themselves to successfully fulfill such intermediary positions is a
relatively understudied phenomenon (but see Albareda, 2018). As Halpin (2014, p. 1)
observes: ‘Scholars would no doubt accept them [issues of organizational design] as
salient, but they remain understudied. They are -- and remain -- themes for the footnotes
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of studies of “other” things like influence, formation, maintenance and population-level
analyses’. This is surprising, as recent studies point out that interest groups significantly
vary in their capacity to connect with their members (Binderkrantz, 2009; Halpin,
2014; Leech, 2012), and hence also in their capability of acquiring and maintaining access
to public decision-making (Kohler-Koch and Quitkatt, 2013). What is more, the deliber-
ate public outreach to such organizations might alter their organizational capabilities to
represent and aggregate societal interests (Fraussen, 2014). How interest groups actually
organize themselves, in other words, their organizational design, thus matters for
explaining their access to public institutions and the degree to which they can fulfill the
intermediary position required from them by many (supra) national public institutions.
In this article we aim to address this gap by examining the effect of organizational design
on interest group access to EU public officials. To do so, we first derive expectations from
public organization theory to examine organizational design, in particular, information
aggregation and information flow, two crucial aspects of interest groups given their dual
task of interest collection and interest articulation. In order for this so-called transmission
belt to function, it requires certain organizational features to generate policy-relevant infor-
mation for public officials. Given the varying informational demand of public officials,
which we take as the starting point of our analytical approach (Arras and Braun, 2017;
Beyers and Braun, 2014; Bouwen, 2002, 2004; Coen and Katsaitis, 2013), we expect dif-
ferent effects of our main explanatory factors – i.e. decision-making procedures, functional
differentiation, EU scope and membership type – on access to different EU public officials.
We test our assumptions based on a novel dataset of organizational design features of
European Associations (EAs) and their access patterns to public officials of the Commis-
sion. We find that qualified majority and consensus-making decision procedures positively
affect interest group access to EU administrative and political officials, whereas functional
differentiation facilitates access to EU administrative officials but not to political officials.
The EU scope of interest groups helps to get access to both types of public official, but does
not seem to matter for gaining more access to political officials.
Our analysis contributes to the study of interest representation in the EU and beyond in
three ways. First, the combination of significant effects of organizational design factors,
combined with limited effects of conventional indicators for organizational type, suggest
the added value of incorporating insights from organizational theory into the study of
interest representation. Second, the varying impact of our factors for either administrative
or political officials confirms the importance of bringing in varying informational
demands by public officials to properly explain access patterns. Finally, our analyses
demonstrate the added value of operationalizing interest group access as a two-step
procedure rather than as a compound measure (cf., Rasmussen and Gross, 2015) since
it shows different results for getting access compared to enjoying higher levels of access.
In sum, our theoretical approach and empirical findings are indicative of the added value
of investigating how interest groups organize themselves to gain access to EU officials.
I. Why Organizational Design Matters for Interest Group Access to EU Public
Officials
Access to EU policy-makers is essential for interest groups operating in the EU policy-
making environment to effectively exercise political influence. Being able to provide
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expertise and share insights regarding the political support of their constituency for new
legislation is a crucial aspect of political influence in general and in the EU in particular
(Bouwen, 2002; Eising, 2007). Most of the outreach of the Commission has been
based on the assumption that interest groups are a crucial link to civil society as a whole
(European Commission, 2001; Kohler-Koch and Quittkat, 2013; Schmitter and Streeck,
1999) and as such can provide them with policy-relevant information. Such a
transmission-belt function is corroborated in the academic literature (Berkhout et al.,
2017a; Kohler-Koch and Quittkat, 2013).
Two broad types of policy-relevant information are distinguished in the literature:
expertise (such as technical specifications and state-of-the-art scientific knowledge), and
political support (such as citizen support and the backing of policy-powerful economic
actors) (Binderkrantz et al., 2014; Bouwen, 2004; Braun, 2012; De Bruycker, 2016;
Klüver, 2013). As both types of information can strengthen the capacity of EU public
institutions to develop effective and legitimate policy proposals, interest groups capable
of offering policy-relevant information have been demonstrated to enjoy high levels of ac-
cess to EU public officials (Bouwen, 2004; Bunea, 2014; Eising, 2007). Moreover, recent
studies show that varying informational demands by public officials explain different
levels of access depending on the type of information interest groups were able to provide
them with (Arras and Braun, 2017; Beyers and Braun, 2014; Bouwen, 2004; Coen and
Katsaitis, 2013). The varying informational demand of policy-makers thus serves as a
key assumption underlying our analytical approach of how organizational structure
affects (levels of) interest group access.
The capacity to offer different types of information to multiple public officials is
strongly linked to the transmission belt function of groups. More specifically, groups need
to aggregate interests as well as to articulate and transform those interests into policy rel-
evant information (cf. Berkhout et al., 2017a). Aggregating, processing and transferring
various types of policy information to distinct types of policy official renders groups akin
to ‘service bureaus’ to policy-makers (Hall and Deardorff, 2006, p. 72; Leech, 2012) and
speaks to their ‘policy capacity’, that is, their ability to provide different kinds of policy-
relevant information (Daugbjerg et al., 2017; Halpin, 2014) to different public officials.
Indeed, key insights from (public) organization theory show that organizational design
has a profound effect on preference formation and policy outcomes (Bach, 2014;
Christensen et al., 2007; Egeberg and Trondal, 2009). Yet, despite the importance of
organizational design in aggregating, channeling and enhancing information flows, very
few studies have examined the role of organizational design in getting access to policy-
makers (but see Braun, 2013; Halpin, 2014).
II. How Organizational Design Relates to Interest Group Access
To assess the effect of organizational design on interest group access to EU public offi-
cials, the article focuses on two dimensions: the flow of information within an organiza-
tion (organizational structure) and how they organize the inclusiveness of their
constituency (representativeness). Organizational structure and representativeness are im-
portant dimensions that enable interest groups to engage in interest aggregation and inter-
est articulation, and more specifically to engage in a diversification of the types of
information supply required by public officials – given their varying informational
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demands. Therefore, different informational demands across and within EU public insti-
tutions require interest groups to offer different types of policy-relevant information and
hence result in varying levels of access to EU administrative and political officials.
Organizational Structure and Interest Group Access
Given the dual organizational task of interest groups of both aggregating and articulating
interests, assessing the effect of organizational structures on interest group access should
entail an analysis of how information flows throughout the organization. Public organiza-
tion theory posits that organizational structure affects how ideas and preferences are being
channeled through organizations via formal units and consequently, formal decision-
making junctures in the organizational hierarchy (cf. Meier, 2010). More specifically,
organizational structures are argued to affect policy outcomes by how they structure both
decision-making processes and the channeling of ideas (Hammond, 1986), or influence
the translation of knowledge from source organizations to recipient organizations (Røvik,
2016). These mechanisms are equally relevant for the organizational design of interest
groups, which operate as a multi-layered structure with independent yet related entities,
including a formal secretariat representing the members. Key insights from public organi-
zation theory on the effect of organizational structure on information flows, combined
with the organizational format of most (EU) interest groups, suggest two important as-
pects that affect their access to EU policy-makers: first, decision-making structures, as
they reflect to what extent members have a say in the interest aggregation (Binderkrantz,
2009; Christensen et al., 2007) and second, functional differentiation of the organization
as it helps to assess their capacity of transforming constituency interests into useful and
distinct packages of policy-relevant information (Gulick, 1937; Klüver, 2012).
First, the decision-making system is critical for how constituency interests are repre-
sented within the interest group (Binderkrantz, 2009). The organizational structure of
many interest groups suggests a delegation or deliberation process whereby member
organizations provide input regarding their preferences and collectively agree on the
interests that the group will represent when seeking access to EU institutions. Decision-
making systems requiring large majorities or consensus – despite increasing transaction
costs, stasis or internal tensions (Greenwood and Webster, 2000; Williamson, 1979) – en-
sure an internal alignment between the members in the association and, therefore, a better
representation of membership interests. Hence, decisions taken by qualified majority or
consensus are expected to reflect both higher levels of membership involvement and a
broader coverage of multiple membership interests than simple majority systems. Even
though consensus may imply diluted or watered-down positions, the political significance
of these decisions is stronger than the ones obtained through simple majority systems. We
expect qualified majority and consensus systems to increase levels of access for both
political and administrative officials as they signal both consensus on substantive aspects
within the associations and, by implication, political support, which is beneficial for both
types of public official. Hence, we hypothesize that:
H1 Interest groups with consensus-oriented or qualified majority decision-making proce-
dures are more likely to enjoy (higher levels of) access to both EU administrative and polit-
ical officials than interest groups with simple majority decision-making procedures.
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A second dimension of organizational structure which we expect to affect the levels of
access is functional differentiation, which is defined as the ‘division of labour within an
organization and the distribution of official duties among a number of positions’ (Klüver,
2012, p. 495). More specifically, functional differentiation implies the creation of separate
units, departments, divisions or working groups under the executive bodies that focus
on different policy issues and/or concrete legal, technical, economic or planning issues
(cf. Gulick, 1937). In that regard, and as noted by Klüver (2012, p. 496), ‘employees
who focus on one specific policy field become specialists in this area and develop impor-
tant expert knowledge’.
The division of labour in particular increases the chances of obtaining access to admin-
istrative officials because labour division allows interest groups to produce policy
positions with detailed information required by policy-makers (Beyers, 2008). That is,
functional differentiation allows associations to provide detailed, technical and
evidence-based information, demonstrated to be beneficial for getting access to the
Commission (Beyers, 2008; Bouwen, 2002; Rasmussen and Gross, 2015). We therefore
expect that interest groups with high levels of specialization enjoy more access to admin-
istrative officials. Yet, we do not expect to find the same relationship with political offi-
cials, who are in need of more political support and less technical expert knowledge
(cf. Beyers and Braun, 2014).
H2a Interest groups with higher degrees of functional differentiation are more likely to en-
joy (higher levels of) access to EU administrative officials than interest groups with lower
levels of functional differentiation.
H2b Interest groups with higher degrees of functional differentiation are not more likely to
enjoy (higher levels of) access to EU political officials than interest groups with lower levels
of functional differentiation.
Representativeness and Interest Group Access
The dual task of interest groups of both interest aggregation and articulation not only
requires them to put in place an organizational structure that facilitates the flow of infor-
mation and capacity to diversify their information supply, it also requires them to ensure
an inclusive representation of their constituency and hence to carefully design their mem-
bership structure. More specifically, a key concern of the Commission is that interest
groups can voice representative policy positions that take into account broad constituen-
cies (European Commission, 2001, p. 4). Additionally, as specified in the consultation
and dialogue communication (European Commission, 2002, p. 20), ‘where appropriate,
the Commission encourages contributions from interested parties organized at the
European level’. We therefore consider two dimensions of membership to examine
organizational representativeness (Pérez-Solórzano Borragán and Smismans, 2012): the
EU scope and level of aggregation in organizational membership.
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Interest groups that can speak on behalf of large constituencies signaling a broadEU cov-
erage (Hull, 1993) can contribute to securing the democratic legitimacy of EU policies
(Eising, 2007). Despite the difficulties associatedwith collective action and lowest common
denominator problems (Beyers, 2008; Eising, 2007), having member organizations from
more EUmember states is expected to strengthen the political relevance of interest groups.
It increases the sectoral weight coverage of the interests relevant to their domain at the
EU level (Beyers, 2008; Michalowitz, 2004), and facilitates the aggregation of EU
encompassing interests. The underlying logic of EU scope to gain access to EU administra-
tive versus EU political officials might be different, but both suggest a similar observable
effect: wider EU representation helps obtain information on EU encompassing interests,
which is relevant for administrative officials, but also helps signal broad political support,
which is advantageous to getting access to EUCommissioners. Hence, we hypothesize that:
H3 Interest groups representing more EU member states are more likely to enjoy (higher
levels of) access to both EU administrative and political officials than interest groups that
represent fewer EU member states.
Membership type is often considered an important aspect of EU interest groups as it
reflects the diversity of the interest group population (Berkhout et al., 2017a; Fraussen
and Beyers, 2016). We specifically focus on the level of aggregation of organizational
membership, namely, the distinction between national and/or regional associations, and
individual organizations, such as firms. While the inclusion of national associations facil-
itates the aggregation and supply of EU encompassing interests, individual organizational
membership facilitates the supply of technical expertise thanks to their direct contact with
their sector (Bouwen, 2002, 2004). In this vein, when interest groups include both types
of member, their chances to gain access to EU administrative officials should increase as
they aggregate both national preferences as well as substantive on-the-ground expertise.
In addition, we expect interest groups with a mixed membership – both national asso-
ciations and individual organizations – to have a higher likelihood of getting access to EU
public officials because they are more attentive to the national stakes and can offer tailor-
made or firm-specific expertise that helps inform the technical aspects of legislative
trajectories. We expect this effect to be stronger for access to EU administrative officials
compared to EU political officials, given that the informational demand of EU administra-
tive officials is likely to require a balance of both political support and technical expertise
(cf. Rasmussen and Gross, 2015), whereas the balance will be often less outspoken for EU
political officials, who are mainly in need of political support (De Bruycker, 2016).
H4a Interest groups with a mixed membership of both national associations and individual
organizations are more likely to enjoy (higher levels of) access to EU administrative offi-
cials than interest groups with a single membership.
H4b Interest groups with a mixed membership of national associations and individual orga-
nizations are not more likely to enjoy (higher levels of) access to EU political officials than
interest groups with a single membership.
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III. Data and Design
To examine how the effects of organizational design of interest groups impact their access
to EU officials, we analyze (the level of) access of a random sample of European Associ-
ations (EAs) to the Commission. We also distinguish between Commission expert groups
and EU Commissioners to examine the variation in access between EU administrative and
political officials.
We took a random sample of EAs to study the effect of organizational design on access
because EAs are a relevant population to study the effect of organizational structure on
interest group access. Given that they all operate at the EU level, studying EAs allows
us to control for other aspects commonly associated with getting access to EU officials
and isolate the effect of organizational design more explicitly. The sample of EAs ob-
tained from this study is based on Wonka et al.’s (2010) article about measuring the size
of the EU interest groups’ population. Wonka et al. compile interest groups from three
different registers: European Parliament door pass holders (2008), the CONNECCS data-
base (2007), and the commercial Landmarks European Public Affairs Directory (2007).
The combination of these three registers provides an inclusive approach and offers a sam-
ple of EU-level interest groups that corrects for biases commonly associated with each of
the individual databases (Berkhout and Lowery, 2010; Berkhout et al., 2017b). Wonka
et al.’s (2010) compilation contains 681 EAs, which are required for the purpose of our
analysis and we drew a random sample of 248 organizations, representing 36.4 per cent
of this database. The compilation dates from 2010, which could be problematic in terms
of accurately depicting the current EU interest community. Yet, we know from recent
studies that at the aggregate level, the EU interest system is quite stable (Berkhout
et al., 2017b), while at the individual level we observe more volatility in terms of persis-
tent versus ad hoc presence as indicated by Commission consultation and EU door pass
registers (Berkhout and Lowery, 2011). We corrected for this individual-level volatility
by using recent observations for the individual organizations. The data sources used to
code the organizational characteristics consisted of the websites of the 248 organizations
included in the sample and their bylaws, which have been obtained through their websites
or Moniteur Belge (the Official Journal of the Kingdom of Belgium), in line with recent
studies of interest populations within the EU and elsewhere (Berkhout et al., 2015,
2017; Hanegraaff et al., 2011). In cases where these documents were not available in
any of the aforementioned sources, one of the authors of this study contacted the EAs’
representatives requesting their bylaws. In total, 213 statutes out of the 248 sampled asso-
ciations were collected. To validate the coding process, the authors reviewed the statutes
and the websites of each EA in the sample at least twice.
Our dependent variables concern access to EU officials of the Commission. We define
access as the ability to meet or to exchange information directly with policy-makers
(Braun, 2012; Halpin and Fraussen, 2017), and we distinguished between access to expert
groups and Commissioners to differentiate between administrative and political officials,
respectively. We decided to focus on intra-institutional variation (administrative versus
political officials within the Commission) to control for inter-institutional variation that
might explain different levels of access as well (Bouwen, 2004). Both types of access,
to expert groups and to Commissioners, are forms of closed access instruments, in
the sense that they are relatively restrictive in terms of membership or participation (cf.
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Pedersen et al., 2015), allowing us to control for the type of access instrument. This
selection has obvious implications in terms of generalization, which we will discuss in
the concluding section of this article.
We distinguish between a binary measure of access (either EAs have access or they
do not have access) and the level of access of EAs. We thus effectively include four
indicators of access. This approach has been previously implemented by Rasmussen
and Gross (2015), whose findings indicate that some factors have different explanatory
power depending on whether we focus on access or level of access. By making this
distinction, this article builds on their contribution and adds to a better understanding
of interest group access.
First, we distinguish between access and levels of access to EU administrative offi-
cials, measured by interest group participation in the Commission’s expert groups. The
dataset used was downloaded on 22 January 2015 and includes 824 expert groups
originating from 28 Directorate-Generals. To operationalize access, we coded organiza-
tions as 0 when EAs do not have access, and 1 when they do have access to expert
groups. To measure the level of access to EU administrative officials we counted the
number of expert committees of the Commission in which they participate as full
members.1 Second, we examine the access and level of access to EU political officials.
To measure this, we counted the number of meetings that the EAs’ representatives had
with Commissioners during the period between November 2014 and September 2016.
These data have been available since December 2014 due to new transparency rules
that require all Commissioners, their Cabinets and Director-Generals to publish their
meetings with all stakeholders (European Commission, 2014). To correct for the
potentially higher barriers that EAs face in order to get access to top EU political
officials, as well as to avoid an overly ad hoc nature of access, we considered a time
range that takes our measurement of access to EU administrative officials as a median
in order to obtain equivalent access measurements in terms of access time period and
restrictiveness.2
Our first independent variable is decision-making procedures within the governance
board, namely the general assembly or the plenary meeting of the EA, and is measured
by decision-making mechanisms laid down in the by-laws of the organizations and
operationalized as 0 in case decisions are taken by simple majority to 51 per cent
majority, and 1 in cases when qualified majority or consensus is required. Our second
independent variable is functional differentiation. It is included as a count variable of
the number of units, departments or working committees established by EAs to inter-
nally structure knowledge and expertise production regarding specialized aspects of the
organization. EU scope is operationalized as membership of EU member states. This
resulted in a count variable of the number of EU member states from which the EA
member organizations originate. Our final organizational variable, type of membership,
refers to the types of organization participating in EAs. We distinguished between EAs
1The Commission distinguishes between members and observers within expert groups. Since observers do not have a voice
to shape policy proposals discussed in the group, this category has been coded as not having access to the Commission.
Importantly, only 9 out of the 248 EAs (3.6 per cent), are observers in expert groups.
2The results of a t-test considering access to both types of public official are significant (Pearson chi2(1) = 28.602,
p = 0.000), indicating that access to administrative and political officials is similarly restrictive.
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with national associations, individual organizations, or both, thus creating a categorical
variable.
We added three control variables to our analyses which refer to organizational
factors commonly included in interest group studies. First, we included organizational
age, measured as the natural logarithm of the years since the organization’s establish-
ment. As argued by Hannan and Freeman (1989, p. 81), older organizations ‘tend to
develop dense webs of exchange, to affiliate with centres of power, and to acquire
an aura of inevitability’ (see also Fraussen and Beyers, 2016). Consequently, we
expect older EAs to be more likely to enjoy (higher levels of) access to both EU
administrative and political officials. Second, we included resources of the EAs – mea-
sured as the number of staff employed by EAs – as an indicator of an organization’s
wealth. Aligned with previous research, we assume that resources will have a positive
effect on the likelihood of getting (higher levels of) access to both administrative and
political officials (Klüver, 2012). Finally, we included a dummy variable that indicates
group type, in particular whether an EA represents either business or non-business
interest groups. In this case, we expect that businesses have (a higher level of) access
to both types of public official since representation tends to be dominated by business
groups (Rasmussen and Carroll, 2013; Wonka et al., 2010). More information on the
variables and their correlations is provided in Tables S1 and S2 in the online
Appendix.
IV. Does Organizational Design Affect Interest Group Access in the EU?
We start with an overall examination of (the level of) access to EU policy-makers. An
initial interesting observation is that 44.76 per cent of the sampled EAs do not have
access to Commission expert groups, whereas 67.33 per cent have not held any meet-
ings with EU Commissioners. This seems to indicate that the obstacles that EAs face
to get access to EU policy-makers in general are quite substantive, and that the thresh-
old for gaining access to EU political officials is higher than for getting access to EU
administrative officials. Additionally, EAs enjoy higher levels of access to expert
groups than to Commissioners. On average, EAs participate in 2.78 expert groups
and have 1.29 meetings with Commissioners, confirming that getting access to EU
administrative and political officials are two substantially different dimensions (see
Table S1 in the online Appendix).
We now turn to bivariate analyses of the effects of organizational design on (the
level of) access. As hypothesized (H1), EAs with a more inclusive decision-making
system that foster the involvement and coverage of members’ interests, enjoy a higher
level of access to EU administrative and political officials; yet, if we focus on getting
access, it appears that qualified majorities and consensus systems are exclusively rele-
vant for getting access to EU administrative officials (see Figures 1 and 2).3 To test
our second hypothesis, we have recoded the variable functional differentiation into
four categories: EAs that do not have such specialized units, EAs that have between
1 and 5units, EAs that have between 6 and 10units, and EAs with more than 10
specialized units. As expected, having more units seems to be correlated with
achieving (higher levels of) access to EU administrative officials, while it is not as
relevant for EU political officials.4
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To examine the effect of EU scope on access (H3), we recoded the variable EU scope
into three levels: low representation when EAs represent between 3 and 11 EU member
states, medium representation when they represent between 12 and 20 states, and high
representation when EAs represent 21 or more EU member states. For each level, we cal-
culated the mean level of access to EU administrative and political officials. As presented
in Figures 1 and 2, the higher the EU scope of EAs, the higher their probability of getting
3Only 18.2 per cent of the EAs take decisions based on qualified majority or consensus. Consequently, we have examined if
there is any significant relationship between EAs that have a restrictive decision-making procedure and (1) type of group
and (2) type of membership. Importantly, the analyses lead to non-significant results.
4We have assessed if there is any significant correlation and relationship between the level of functional differentiation with
resources, having a broad issue scope, and with group and membership type. The relationship between resources and issue
scope with functional differentiation is significant. However, the coefficients are below 0.4, indicating that these are sub-
stantively different factors.
Figure 1: EAs with access to EU administrative and political officials (%).
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(higher levels of) access to EU administrative officials. However, this variable is not that
important for getting (higher levels of) access to EU political officials.
Finally, the bivariate analysis of the relationships between membership type and access
indicates, on the one hand, that EAs exclusively consisting of individual organizations
have more limited access to administrative officials compared to groups with national as-
sociations or with both national associations and individual organizations. On the other
hand, EAs comprised of both national associations and individual organizations have
more (and higher levels of) access to political officials.
Multivariate Analysis: Hurdle Negative Binomial Model
We further test our hypotheses with a multivariate model. To model the two dimensions
of access, we opted for a hurdle negative binomial model, allowing us to test how our
main explanatory variables affect access as well as the level of access enjoyed by EAs.
Figure 2: Level of access of EAs to EU administrative and political officials (average number of
meetings).
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The hurdle negative binomial model is mixed by a binary outcome of the count being be-
low or above the hurdle (that is, having access to EU administrative or political officials)
with a truncated model for outcomes above the hurdle (that is, the level of access) (Ehsan
Saffari et al., 2012). Additionally, this model accounts for the over-dispersion of our
count outcome variables (Ehsan Saffari et al., 2012).5 Table 1 presents our main models
for EU administrative and political officials.
We find that the most significant effect of all hypothesized factors is related to organi-
zational design for decision-making procedures (H1). More concretely, when EAs have
qualified majority or consensus based decision-making procedures, they are more likely
to enjoy (higher levels of) access to EU administrative officials. Moreover, this
decision-making procedure helps facilitate higher levels of access to political officials.
As expected, functional differentiation matters for enjoying (higher levels of) access to
administrative officials, but not to political officials, which confirms H2a and H2b. We
included the continuous data for the variables functional differentiation and EU scope,
rather than the recoded categorical data we used for the bivariate analysis.6
Representativeness matters as well, in the expected direction (H3). A wider EU scope
helps to get (higher levels of) access to EU administrative officials as well as political of-
ficials, yet loses relevance when it comes to gaining higher levels of access to EU political
officials. Our findings on mixed membership of EAs are complicated to interpret at this
stage. The findings indicated opposite effects than hypothesized or did not yield signifi-
cant effects. Moreover, the actual effects do not seem to follow a straightforward pattern.
If anything, these findings could signal that the level of interest aggregation (mixed versus
national versus individual organizations) becomes less outspoken than several studies
have implied until now (Bouwen, 2002, 2004; Bunea, 2014; Eising, 2007; Fraussen
and Beyers, 2016).
The findings concerning the control variables suggest that common factors used to
explain varying degrees of interest groups are modestly relevant, and at least not more
important than our main expected effects. Only interest group resources offer a consistent
positive effect for getting access, and confirm earlier studies in this regard (Klüver, 2012).
Group type only affects access to political officials, more specifically, business associa-
tions have fewer levels of access to EU political officials than non-business EAs. The
non-significant results are in line with previous research that does not find differences
between business and non-business groups (Klüver, 2012; Rasmussen and Gross,
2015). A plausible explanation for these findings relates to the efforts of the Commission
to avoid business bias (European Commission, 2002), and to the (funding) mechanisms
aimed at supporting underrepresented groups (Persson and Edholm, 2017), but could also
5An alternative to this model would be a zero-inflated regression model, which attempts to account for excess zeros. How-
ever, it is not theoretically clear which substantive factors predict whether a group always (or only sometimes) has the value
of zero (Long and Freese, 2001). Nonetheless, various tests have been conducted to ensure the robustness of the results. The
results and their significance levels hold when running the analysis with zero-inflated negative binomial and zero-inflated
Poisson with age and resources accounting for the inflation part. To further test the robustness of the findings, the model
has been replicated for four different sectors: economy, environment, health and utilities. Overall, the effects of organiza-
tional design hold, but are also sensitive to contextual factors, which is in line with previous research.
6To check the robustness of the results in Table 1, we have conducted the same models with the variables ‘EU scope’ and
‘functional differentiation’ transformed in ordinal (as in the bivariate analysis). The directions of the coefficients and their
significance levels for both variables in each model remain the same except for the coefficient of ‘functional differentiation’
related to the level of access to administrative officials, which is weakened (p = 0.116). Yet, if we code ‘functional differ-
entiation’ in six or more categories the results are significant as in Table 1.
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speak to a more general informational demand by political officials, which is adequately
captured by an aggregate measure of organizational type.
Overall, the findings support our hypotheses, and most notably, confirm our expecta-
tion that organizational design matters for gaining access to EU public officials, but is
influenced by the varying informational demands of public officials.
Conclusion
Our main aim in this article was to better understand the effect of organizational design on
interest group access to EU public officials. Interest groups, in particular EAs, are
supposed to operate as a transmission belt and thereby simultaneously aggregate and
articulate interests to policy-makers. To properly perform such a transmission belt func-
tion, an organizational design fit for this purpose is a crucial aspect to consider when
studying interest group access. In this article, we tested the effect of two aspects of orga-
nizational design (organizational structure and representativeness) on interest group ac-
cess to EU public officials. We find that, first, qualified majority and consensus
decision-making procedures positively affect interest group access to EU administrative
officials and political officials. Second, functional differentiation facilitates access to
EU administrative officials but not to political officials, as we expected. The EU scope
of interest groups helps to get access to administrative and political officials, but does
not seem to matter for enjoying more access to political officials.
Overall, our findings suggest two important observations. First, the significant effects
of the variables related to organizational design, in particular decision-making procedures
and functional differentiation, combined with the limited effects of commonly used indi-
cators of interest group type, are indicative of the added value of including organizational
design in the study of interest group access and how they internally operate to fulfill their
dual task of interest aggregation and interest articulation. Second, the variation in the
effects of organizational design factors between administrative and political officials
suggests that access to different public officials is indeed driven by different mechanisms
and should be examined accordingly, both theoretically and empirically.
Two important considerations regarding our research design are our focus on European
Associations and the specific venues we selected to study interest group access. Our se-
lection of EAs facilitated the study of organizational structure as they are all characterized
by a multi-level organizational structure. This is clearly different for national interest
groups, which may not have such a multi-level structure and for which information flow,
and hence decision-making procedures and functional differentiation, might operate dif-
ferently in order to structure the two-way information flow intrinsic to the transmission
belt function. Second, we opted for intra-institutional variation between administrative
and political officials and for different actual access points. Other options to get access
to administrative officials, such as open consultations, or hearings when it comes to
access to political officials, might have a different effect, as has been earlier indicated
by the distinction between open and closed access instruments (Arras and Braun, 2017;
Pedersen et al., 2015).
These limitations bring us to important implications and suggestions for future re-
search. First, as has been demonstrated, organizational design of interest groups matters.
Future research should focus on how precisely it affects successful mobilization and
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political advocacy (Albareda, 2018). Therefore, future research could for instance delve
into governance structures of interest groups and examine other relevant factors such as
the professionalization of the staff (Klüver, 2012); the identity of the organization (Halpin
and Daugbjerg, 2015); the autonomy of and the relationship between governance and ex-
ecutive boards (Martínez-Díaz, 2009); and the behavioural dimension of organizations
(Saz-Carranza and Ospina, 2011).
Second, although we ran separate regression models for access to administrative and
political officials, our findings confirm the necessity to diversify between access to differ-
ent public officials given their varying informational demands demonstrated elsewhere
(Arras and Braun, 2017; Beyers and Braun, 2014; Bouwen, 2004; Coen and Katsaitis,
2013). Our results also suggest the importance of incorporating other contextual factors,
such as the network position of interest groups (Beyers and Braun, 2014), previous rela-
tions with public officials and the reputation of the interest groups (Berkhout et al., 2015;
Braun, 2012; Fraussen, 2014), or other more general demand-side factors such as policy
issues under debate (Coen and Katsaitis, 2013). As our robustness checks have indicated,
for instance, the effect of sector variation is important to include when examining factors
of organizational design. Consequently, further research should adopt an explicitly
contextualized model of interest group access, thereby not only varying between types
of official but also taking into account a time dimension as getting access to different
types of public official seems to be a different matter than enjoying prolonged access
(Braun, 2013; Fraussen et al., 2014; Klüver et al., 2015). Getting initial access and
subsequently enjoying higher and more diverse levels of access presumably requires a
complex organizational design. Our analyses thus indicate that organizing for influence
is a valuable, yet hitherto underrated, subject of study within the field of interest represen-
tation in the EU and elsewhere.
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